Air India Flight 171
On June 12, 2025, Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (registration VT-ANB), crashed 32 seconds after takeoff from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport, Ahmedabad, India, en route to London Gatwick. Carrying 230 passengers and 12 crew members, the aircraft struck a medical college hostel in Meghani Nagar at 625 feet above ground level, resulting in 241 fatalities on board and 19 on the ground, with one survivor, Vishwash Kumar Ramesh (seat 11A). The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau’s preliminary report, submitted on July 11, 2025, identified the movement of both engine fuel control switches to “CUTOFF” three seconds after liftoff as the initiating event, causing dual-engine failure (AAIB, 2025). I delayed writing this post to avoid speculation amid unanswered questions, but the evidence now points to a troubling conclusion: the fuel switches were deliberately shut off shortly after takeoff.
The flight departed Runway 23 at 8:07 UTC (1:37 p.m. IST) under visual meteorological conditions: 6,000-meter visibility, 7-knot wind from 250 degrees, and a temperature of 35°C. Captain Sumeet Sabharwal (8,200 hours, extensive 787 experience) and First Officer Clive Kunder (1,100 hours on type) completed preflight checks on the 11-year-old airframe, equipped with General Electric GEnx-1B engines (right engine installed March 2025, left serviced 2023). The aircraft, loaded with almost 200,000 lbs of fuel, maintained a standard takeoff configuration: flaps at 5 degrees and slats extended. At 8:08:42 UTC, the flight data recorder (FDR) recorded both fuel control switches moving from “RUN” to “CUTOFF” within one second, halting fuel flow to the engines (AAIB, 2025). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) captured Sabharwal inquiring about the cutoff with Kunder, who denied taking any action. The switches were found in the “RUN” position at the crash site, suggesting a relight attempt. The RAT (ram air turbine) deployed automatically, providing emergency electrical and hydraulic power, as confirmed by analysis of bystander footage. The landing gear remained down, and the flaps stayed at 5 degrees, consistent with takeoff settings and a loss of hydraulic power after the engine shutdown.
The aircraft reached 625 feet before losing thrust, with the FDR showing an 8-degree nose-up attitude and level wings at impact (8:09:20 UTC). Engine 1 briefly relit, per FDR data, but Engine 2 failed to stabilize, and the thrust levers, set to takeoff power, were found at idle post-crash, indicating pilot intervention (AAIB, 2025). A “MAYDAY” call was issued at 8:09:05 UTC, 15 seconds before impact. The gear-down status likely resulted from the hydraulic failure, as the 787’s engine-driven pumps are required to raise the gear, and the RAT powers only some flight controls and emergency electrical systems. The flaps were set to 5 degrees, and the slats were extended, which was appropriate, ruling out configuration errors as the primary cause (CNN, 2025). The crash, impacting at 180 knots, destroyed five buildings, with wreckage analysis confirming the RAT’s deployment and gear position.
Human factors analysis highlights multiple failure points. The fuel control switches, equipped with locking mechanisms, have a documented vulnerability to unintentional disengagement, as noted in a 2018 FAA bulletin (SAIB NM-18-33), though not mandatory for Air India to address (Republic World, 2025). Inadvertent pilot contact is unlikely given the deliberate action required. I can attest that it is virtually impossible to shut these switches off accidentally. An electrical or mechanical fault in the 787’s solid-state power controllers remains under investigation, though I see this as highly unlikely. The CVR indicates a breakdown in Crew Resource Management (CRM), with the pilots’ confusion reflecting a startle effect—a cognitive overload I’ve observed in the aircraft and simulator training during unexpected failures. In this case, it appeared the captain was startled by what had happened. The co-pilot stated that he did not shut off the fuel controls. New information now indicates that the captain was suffering from mental health problems. We may never know which pilot moved the switches; however, I’m nearly certain that someone did. At 625 feet, a dual-engine failure exceeds standard training scenarios, which focus on single-engine events. One pilot’s attempted relight shows adherence to emergency procedures, but the low altitude precluded recovery. Air India’s maintenance, compliant with DGCA standards, included five Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items, such as a nitrogen generation system issue, an ordinary and inconsequential write-up. Systemic factors include the DGCA’s limited oversight capacity and Air India’s failure to inspect fuel switches, despite the FAA bulletin.
The AAIB, supported by the NTSB, Boeing, and GE Aerospace, is examining mechanical failure, human error, and sabotage. The FDR and CVR were recovered on June 13 and 16, 2025, and preliminary findings were released on June 25, with no further data released publicly (AAIB, 2025). A Boeing simulation confirmed the fuel cutoff’s catastrophic impact, and real-time satellite telemetry is being reviewed for instrument anomalies. Sabotage, raised by India’s Civil Aviation Minister, lacks evidence but remains a focus due to the switches’ movement (Post:2). The final report, expected by June 2026, will clarify these factors. The DGCA ordered inspections of India’s 33 787s, leading to 66 flight cancellations, which reflected the operational fallout.
Legal proceedings have commenced under the Montreal Convention. By July 11, 2025, Keystone Law had filed claims on behalf of 20 British families, targeting Air India, Boeing, and GE for negligence in maintenance, design, and training, with 53 British, seven Portuguese, and one Canadian victim, thereby internationalizing the case (CNN, 2025). Insurance estimates range from $120–250 million, including $75–80 million for the hull loss. A class-action suit is anticipated, likely citing the DGCA’s failure to address the 2018 bulletin. I expect plaintiffs to pursue a claim of gross negligence to challenge sovereign immunity for the DGCA and AAIB, seeking damages exceeding the Convention’s $170,000 per-passenger cap. Boeing faces liability for the throttle quadrant design, GE for FADEC performance, and Air India for operational oversight. The Russian diplomat’s death adds diplomatic complexity, with Russia seeking priority in settlements. Future litigation may drive airworthiness directives for fuel switches and stricter DGCA regulations.
If, as I suspect, the AAIB’s final report, due by June 2026, confirms that either the captain or the first officer intentionally moved both engine fuel control switches to “CUTOFF” three seconds after takeoff, other investigative avenues—mechanical failure or sabotage—will become secondary. Such an act, though rare, would echo past incidents where pilots with mental health issues deliberately crashed aircraft, such as Germanwings Flight 9525 in 2015, where co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, with diagnosed depression, flew into the Alps, killing 150 (NTSB, 2015), or EgyptAir Flight 990 in 1999, where the NTSB found relief pilot Gameel Al-Batouti’s actions, linked to psychological distress, caused the crash, killing 217 (NTSB, 2002). This would necessitate enhanced mental health screening for pilots, beyond current DGCA and FAA protocols, to address latent risks. Legal actions are likely to focus on Air India’s crew vetting processes, with plaintiffs arguing negligence under the Montreal Convention. Meanwhile, regulators may mandate stricter psychological evaluations to prevent future tragedies. I will monitor for any updates as they occur.
