767 Clips the Turnpike at Newark
On May 3, 2026, United Airlines Flight 169, a Boeing 767-400ER arriving from Venice, Italy, was on short final to Runway 29 at Newark Liberty International Airport when its landing gear and underside struck a light pole and then a bakery delivery truck on the New Jersey Turnpike. The aircraft landed safely with 231 souls on board unharmed; the truck driver sustained only minor injuries. Dashcam video and airport security footage captured the moment, and the NTSB has opened an investigation. As a retired airline captain who has flown the Stadium Visual approach to Runway 29 many times in the Boeing 727 and twice in the much larger MD-11, I watched the reports with a mixture of professional curiosity and familiarity.
Runway 29 at EWR is the airport’s shortest runway at just 6,725 feet. It is used primarily when winds favor an east-west operation, as they did that afternoon with gusts reported up to 35 mph. The Stadium Visual is the published procedure for this runway. After crossing the Teterboro VOR at 3,000 feet, you proceed to GIMEE at or above 2,500 feet, then turn left on a 190° heading along the east side of the Hackensack River. You cross HILOK between 2,000 and 1,500 feet, continue to SLIMR, and then make the final right turn onto the extended centerline for Runway 29. The last few miles take you low over Newark Bay and directly across the New Jersey Turnpike.
On a stabilized 3° visual approach with a standard 50-foot threshold crossing height, the aircraft should be approximately 100–120 feet above ground level when crossing the western lanes of the Turnpike (roughly 700–800 feet prior to the threshold). Regardless of which published approach the crew was flying—the Stadium Visual or the RNAV (GPS) W—the importance of rigorously cross-checking crossing altitudes cannot be overstated, especially at the final two fixes. On the Stadium Visual, COPKO is at 700 feet, and CHUMR is at 500 feet. On the RNAV (GPS) W, they are AXEL and NOWAY, which serve as additional visual guidance fixes with recommended crossing altitudes. These points are mandatory cross-checks that every crew must verify against the aircraft’s altimeter and the PAPI. A deviation below either gate is a clear indication that the approach has become unstable and should trigger an immediate correction or a go-around. There is no acceptable reason to continue below these altitudes in visual conditions.
I have flown this exact approach in aircraft larger and heavier than the 767 involved. In the 727, with its relatively short wingspan and responsive handling, the maneuver felt manageable once you were familiar with the landmarks. The MD-11, with its long body and higher cockpit, demanded even more precise speed and altitude control because any deviation became magnified in the last mile. In both types, the key was the same: stay on the proper glidepath, keep the aircraft stabilized at approach speed with configuration complete, and rigorously cross-check the published fixes. Landing long on a short runway is a real concern, but being dangerously low on short final is never an acceptable trade-off.
The weather on May 3 was reported as good VMC with daylight conditions—precisely the environment in which this visual should be routine. There was no fog, no low visibility, and no compelling reason for the aircraft to be low enough to strike fixed objects on the highway. That the crew was able to continue to a safe landing speaks to the inherent robustness of the Boeing 767 and the crew’s handling after the contact, but the fact that contact occurred at all is concerning. Runway 29’s proximity to the Turnpike has long been a known characteristic of operations at Newark; it is not new, nor is it inherently unsafe when flown as designed, though this fact will certainly come into dispute as the accident is investigated.
Every approach into a major airport carries risk, but the Stadium Visual to 29 is one that rewards discipline and situational awareness. As the NTSB gathers data from the flight recorders and interviews the crew, the rest of us who fly these procedures are reminded once again that visual approaches are not “relaxed” approaches. They demand the same precision we apply to any instrument procedure, especially when the runway is short, and the margin for error over busy highways is measured in feet rather than miles. Strict adherence to the published altitude gates at COPKO and CHUMR is not bureaucracy — it is the final safety net that prevents a stable approach from becoming an accident.
Safe flying is never the result of luck. It is the product of rigorous adherence to stabilized approach criteria, honest self-assessment, and respect for the unique challenges each runway presents. The United 169 incident is an illustration of why those standards exist—even on a clear, sunny afternoon at one of the world’s busiest airports.
